Generic finiteness of equilibrium payoffs for bimatrix games

It is shown that in any affine space of payoff matrices the equilibrium payoffs of bimatrix games are generically finite.Bimatrix Games, Generic Finiteness

The European Space of Higher Education: Incentive and Governance Issues

This lecture offers thoughts on some issues concerning the effective development of the European space of higher education currently being pushed by the twin forces of the Bologna process and the Lisbon declaration of the EU. It is pointed out that the USA example is a good reference point but cannot be imitated mechanically, given the more segmented reality of Europe. It is noted that the European space could develop first at the graduate level and that the competition for students through reputation effects may play an essential role. The significance of policy initiatives for promoting reform is emphasized. Finally, matters of governance and of incentives (including tenure) are identified as key factors of reform

Notes on stochastic choice

A general formalism on stochastic choice is presented. Tje Rationalizability and Recoverability (Identification) problems are discussed. For the identification issue parametric examples are analyzed by means of techniques of mathematical tomography (Random transforms).Stochastic choice, recoverability, identification, random transform

Stochastic uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibrium

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in addition to random moves some recall is introduced, then successful search procedures that are uncoupled can be devised. In particular, to get almost sure convergence to pure Nash equilibria when these exist, it su±ces to recall the last two periods of play.Uncoupled, Nash equilibrium, stochastic dynamics, bounded recall

Sobre el Premi Nobel d'Economia 2005, concedit a Robert J. Aumann i Thomas C. Schelling

La concessió del Premi Nobel d'Economia 2005 a Robert J. Aumann i Thomas C. Schelling confirma la influència de la teoria de jocs i l'interès social que desperta. L'any 1994, John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr. i Reinhard Selten compartiren el Premi «per la seva anàlisi pionera de l'equilibri en la teoria de jocs no cooperatius». Aumann i Schelling, guardonats «per haver ampliat la nostra comprensió del conflicte i la cooperació mitjançant l'anàlisi de la teoria de jocs», són dos teòrics que han estudiat les motivacions i conseqüències del paradigma de la racionalitat en l'acció humana. Aquest treball és una breu revisió dels fonaments teòrics de l'estratègia del conflicte i de l'equilibri de la por, elements que han estat presents en situacions com ara la guerra freda i que són a la base de decisions d'alta política mundial. S'analitzen aquestes i altres aportacions dels dos guardonats, les variants del dilema del presoner i la seva aplicació en estratègies tant de política defensiva-ofensiva com d'inversió econòmica , i els raonaments en la presa de decisions d'abast particular.The Nobel Prize for Economics 2005 for Robert J. Aumann and Thomas C. Schelling comes in recognition of the influence of the theory of games and the social interest it arouses. In 1994, John C. Harsanyi, John F. Nash Jr. and Reinhard Selten shared the award for their pioneering analysis of the equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games. Aumann and Schelling, who received the award for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game theory analysis, are two theoreticians who have studied the motivations and consequences of the paradigm of rationality in human action. This work is a brief review of the theoretical foundations of the conflict and the balance of fear, elements that have been present in situations such as the ColdWar and lie at the heart of decisions in high-level world politics. These, and other contributions by both award-winners are analyzed, as well as the variants of the prisoners dilemma and their application to strategies including defensive- offensive politics, economic investment and reasoning in private decision-making

The European pathways of Catalonia : research

The need for research permit me to put on the table the ideological viewpoint from which I address today's reflections to you. It is that of historical Catalanism, in its more international version, which in these times I would accept as the will and ambition not to be just another European country. We aspire to be what we are not yet: a first-line country in Europe. I have to persuade you that this statement is closely tied to today's theme. I have to convince you that, for Catalonia to be in this first line, it will have to be a country strong in research

Cooperative games in strategic form

In this paper we view bargaining and cooperation as an interaction superimposed on a strategic form game. A multistage bargaining procedure for N players, the “proposer commitment” procedure, is presented. It is inspired by Nash’s two-player variable-threat model; a key feature is the commitment to “threats.” We establish links to classical cooperative game theory solutions, such as the Shapley value in the transferable utility case. However, we show that even in standard pure exchange economies the traditional coalitional function may not be adequate when utilities are not transferable.Bargaining, Commitment, Nash variable threat